Kidnap, Ransom and Extortion: prevention, intelligence and response.
Kidnapping, extortion and wrongful detention can affect travelers, families, employees and
organizations worldwide. Understanding the threat and preparing before an incident can reduce
exposure and improve decision-making.
This hub is an educational resource: what the threats are, who they affect, how to prepare,
and where to find authoritative help. It is not an emergency response platform.
Written and reviewed by Global Risk Services (GRS), the Kidnap, Ransom and Extortion team
at Global Rescue. Our response consultants include former members of the FBI Crisis Negotiation
Unit and International Operations Division. Cases described here are drawn from real-life cases,
with identifying details removed. Last reviewed 9 August 2026.
Overview
What kidnap, ransom and extortion means — and why preparation matters
Kidnap, ransom and extortion (KRE) covers a family of crimes in which a person is taken,
or claimed to be taken, or coerced, in order to obtain money, property, concessions or
advantage. Most of it is not what people picture. In several common scenarios, nobody is
abducted at all — and preparation, not payment, is what defeats them.
Who this hub is for
This resource is written for the people a KRE incident actually reaches: individual
travelers and their families; students, journalists, aid workers and executives; and the
organizations responsible for people who travel or work abroad. Guidance is grouped so you
can go straight to what applies to you.
What you will find here
Threat types — clear definitions of the scenarios travelers and organizations actually face.
Who is at risk — how exposure differs by traveler, family, organization and role.
Prevention — the conditions and behaviors that raise or lower exposure, with specific guidance for travelers and for businesses.
If an incident occurs — high-level, educational principles, and where to turn.
Data and trends — sourced statistics, with methodology and citations.
Government and institutional resources — a curated directory of authoritative external sources.
This is an educational resource, not an emergency service
This resource provides general educational information and is not an emergency response
platform. If you believe someone is in immediate danger or an incident may be underway,
contact the appropriate local authorities, government resources or your organization's
designated emergency contact.
Global Rescue members with Security ULTIMATE can activate Emergency in the Global Rescue App to reach the operations center directly.
The scenarios travelers and organizations actually face
These categories are not academic. They differ in who is taken, who is contacted, what is
demanded, and how long it lasts — and therefore in what you should do. Confusing one for
another is itself a risk: the advice that helps in a kidnap for ransom is the wrong advice
in a levantón. Each entry below defines the scenario, notes who tends to be targeted, and
gives a general prevention consideration.
Core kidnapping and extortion scenarios
Someone is taken
Kidnap for ransom
Also: classic kidnapping, K&R
The unlawful detention of a person in order to demand payment or concessions from a third party — usually a family member or an employer — in exchange for release.
Who is targeted
Often selected on the appearance of wealth or a corporate affiliation, frequently after surveillance. Actual wealth matters less than perceived wealth.
Prevention consideration
Vary routines, avoid displaying wealth, share your itinerary, and agree a proof-of-life code word.
No one is taken
Virtual kidnapping
Also: ransom scam, virtual kidnap for ransom
An extortion scam in which criminals falsely claim to have abducted a loved one and demand an immediate ransom. No abduction occurs; the scheme runs on fear, urgency and speed.
Who is targeted
Anyone reachable by phone; travelers who have posted that they will be somewhere without cell service are especially exposed.
Prevention consideration
A pre-agreed code word ends it in seconds. Criminals now use AI voice clones and altered proof-of-life media, so verification — not "recognizing the voice" — is what defeats it.1
Someone is taken
Express kidnapping
Spanish: secuestro exprés
A short-term abduction in which criminals force a victim to withdraw maximum cash from ATMs or move funds through banking apps. It typically ends within hours, once accounts are exhausted.
Who is targeted
Opportunistic — often travelers who hail street taxis. Common in parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.2
Prevention consideration
Set low daily card limits, use vetted transport, and carry few cards. The specific danger is being "sold up" to a group for a longer kidnapping.
No one is taken
Extortion
Also: extortion calls, prison-run extortion
Obtaining money, property or services through coercion, intimidation or threats of violence — forcing victims to act out of fear of harm, exposure or reputational damage.
Who is targeted
Isolated individuals and families. Criminals build false credibility with accurate personal detail gathered from surveillance, social media, or a frightened relative earlier in the same call.
Prevention consideration
Recognize the structure — schemes separate people and keep each on the phone. A code word converts "do they have my son?" into a yes-or-no question.
Someone is taken
Levantón
Spanish: "picked up"
A quick, forcible abduction carried out with no ransom demand and no contact with the victim's family. Motives vary and often remain unknown; many victims are never found.
Who is targeted
Frequently opportunistic or mistaken-identity; can follow surveillance. Meeting strangers from online marketplaces is a recurring pattern.
Prevention consideration
Because there is no process to negotiate, the advice inverts: humanizing yourself and, where possible, escape matter more than waiting.
Staged by the "victim"
Fake kidnapping
Also: staged abduction, self-kidnapping
A hoax in which a person fabricates their own abduction, or someone else's, for personal or financial gain.
Who is targeted
The family or employer of the person staging it. This is the case where the "victim" is a participant, which inverts verification: it exposes rather than rescues.
Prevention consideration
Ask questions and check the financial trail — trust, but verify. Proof-of-life discipline protects you even when the call comes from inside the family.
Also: hostage diplomacy, state hostage-taking, arbitrary detention
The abduction — or state detention — of a person to obtain political concessions such as a prisoner exchange, funding, or propaganda. The counterparty is a government or armed group, and timelines can run to months or years. Where a government is the actor and the detention is unlawful or arbitrary, it is termed wrongful or arbitrary detention.
Who is targeted
Travelers to countries with tensions with their own nation; dual nationals; and people who can be used as leverage — business travelers, academics and journalists in countries with a documented pattern of the practice.
Prevention consideration
Check the current State Department Travel Advisory before you go: the "K" indicator flags kidnapping and hostage-taking risk,3 and the newer "D" indicator flags wrongful detention.13 Weigh dual-nationality and prior-affiliation risks for the destination, and ensure consular services are engaged if detained.
A child is taken
Familial or parental abduction
Also: family abduction, custodial interference
When one parent unlawfully takes, conceals or retains a child in violation of the other parent's custodial rights. More common than kidnap for ransom, and unlike the others it runs on courts, treaties and warrants — not negotiation.
Who is targeted
Children in families with an international dimension or a custody dispute. Cross-border cases are far harder to resolve after departure.
Prevention consideration
Address custody through the courts before travel. The route back across borders is the Hague Abduction Convention, which restores the status quo but does not decide custody.4
Related and emerging threats
Beyond the core scenarios, these related forms of kidnap and extortion affect particular groups, sectors and regions. Cyber ransomware is acknowledged here but, by design, points to specialist resources rather than expanding to dominate a travel-security hub.
Coercion of a third party
Tiger kidnapping
Also: tiger kidnap
A hostage — often a family member — is held to coerce a second person, usually an employee with privileged access, into handing over cash, valuables or facility access. The person forced to act is not the one held.
Who is targeted
Bank staff, cash-in-transit crews, retail and jewelry managers, and their close relatives. Historically most prevalent in the UK and Ireland.8
Prevention consideration
Cash-handling and access controls that assume no single employee can be coerced into full access — dual control, duress codes, verification call-backs — reduce the payoff.
Someone is taken
Opportunistic abduction
Also: crime-of-opportunity kidnapping
An unplanned, circumstantial kidnapping — the victim is seized because they present themselves as an available, vulnerable or apparently affluent target at that moment, not because they were pre-selected.
Who is targeted
Anyone who reads as vulnerable or wealthy; travelers and foreign nationals disproportionately, because of visibility and assumed resources. Many express kidnappings are opportunistic.2
Prevention consideration
Reduce predictability and visible vulnerability — vetted transport, situational awareness, and avoiding isolated or high-risk areas removes the opening these crimes depend on.
Someone is taken
Terrorist hostage-taking
Distinct from criminal kidnap-for-ransom
The seizing of hostages by a terrorist or ideological group to advance political, ideological or financing objectives — as opposed to criminal kidnap-for-ransom, where the motive is purely financial.
Who is targeted
Nationals seen as high-value for propaganda or leverage, aid workers, journalists, and personnel in conflict or extremist-controlled areas. Ransom paid to a designated group is also a terrorist-financing concern in its own right.9
Government policy
The U.S. and UK both maintain long-standing no-concessions policies — neither government will itself pay a ransom to a terrorist group. That is not the same as "no engagement," and the two countries do not treat private payment the same way.10What "no concessions" means in practice →
Prevention consideration
Threat-informed travel planning and avoiding non-essential travel to active extremist-operating areas is the primary mitigation.
Crew taken at sea
Maritime kidnapping
Kidnap-for-ransom of crew
The abduction of ship crew, usually for ransom, during piracy or armed-robbery attacks at sea — concentrated overwhelmingly in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa.
Who is targeted
Senior crew and foreign nationals aboard commercial vessels transiting or operating in high-risk waters. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 23 of the 25 crew kidnapped at sea in 2025.14
Prevention consideration
Follow current IMB advisories and industry Best Management Practices for high-risk waters, and report to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre.
No one is taken
Sextortion and reputational extortion
Includes financial sextortion
Coercion in which an offender threatens to release intimate, embarrassing or reputation-damaging material unless the victim pays or provides more images. Financial sextortion — demanding money — is a fast-growing variant.
Who is targeted
The FBI warns financial sextortion disproportionately targets minors and teens, especially boys aged roughly 14–17; adults are also targeted, often through fake profiles or romance approaches.15
Prevention consideration
Do not send intimate images to unverified contacts; preserve evidence and report to the FBI's IC3 rather than paying — payment typically invites further demands.
No one is taken
Cyber-enabled extortion
Ransomware & data extortion, "double extortion"
Extortion carried out through cyber means: encrypting an organization's systems and/or stealing its data, then demanding payment to restore access or to prevent publication.
Who is targeted
Organizations of every size and sector, including critical infrastructure.
Prevention consideration
This is a large field of its own. Follow CISA's #StopRansomware guidance — offline backups, patching, MFA, and a tested incident-response plan — as the authoritative reference.16
Extortion of business
Protection-payment schemes
Spanish: cobro de piso
Recurring extortion payments demanded from businesses by criminal organizations in exchange for being allowed to operate — known in Mexico and parts of Latin America as cobro de piso, "floor charge."
Who is targeted
Local merchants, larger enterprises, transporters and producers in areas under criminal-group control; foreign-owned businesses are not exempt.17
Prevention consideration
Treat it as an organized-crime and duty-of-care issue: local security and legal counsel and law-enforcement liaison. Note that payments to sanctioned groups can carry legal exposure.
Role-based targeting
Threats against executives or employees
Executive-targeting, workplace threats
Targeted threats, intimidation or violence directed at company leaders or staff — including kidnap, extortion and travel- or workplace-related threats — because of their role, visibility or perceived value.
Who is targeted
Senior executives and high-profile personnel, and at times their families and colleagues — particularly in higher-risk regions or exposed industries.
Prevention consideration
Threat assessments, travel-risk management aligned to ISO 31030, and executive-protection planning proportionate to role and destination risk.18
How the core scenarios compare
The fastest way to see why one label does not fit all of them. Note especially the second column: in three scenarios, no abduction has occurred at all.
Comparison of the core kidnapping and extortion scenarios, per Global Rescue's Global Risk Services team.
Scenario
Is anyone actually abducted?
Who is contacted
Typical duration
Is a ransom demanded?
Kidnap for ransom
Yes
Family or employer
Days to months
Yes
Virtual kidnapping
No — nobody is taken
The family, by phone
Hours to days
Yes
Express kidnapping
Yes
Nobody — the victim's own accounts are drained
Hours to overnight
No — cash is taken directly
Extortion
No — nobody is taken
Whoever answers the phone
Hours to days
Yes
Levantón
Yes
Nobody — no contact is made
Often permanent
No
Fake kidnapping
No — staged by the "victim"
Family or employer
Hours to days
Yes
Political / wrongful detention
Yes
A government
Months to years
Concessions, sometimes ransom
Parental abduction
Yes — a child
Nobody — it is a custody dispute
Months to years
No
Note on scope: cyber ransomware and data extortion are acknowledged here as extortion
variants, but specialized cybersecurity guidance is best sourced from CISA's #StopRansomware
resources rather than a travel-security hub. See Government & institutional resources.
Who Is at Risk
Which guidance applies to your situation
Exposure is not uniform. It varies by where you go, what you do there, how visible you are,
and who is responsible for you. Use these groups to find the guidance that fits — each leads
to preventive advice, not just to services.
Individual travelers
Leisure and adventure travelers, journalists, researchers, humanitarian workers, high-profile individuals, and people visiting friends and relatives.
Families traveling with children, students studying abroad, parents of international travelers, families of executives or public figures, and families concerned about international parental abduction.
Business travelers, executives, expatriates and remote employees; NGOs and humanitarian organizations; energy, mining and infrastructure companies; universities and study-abroad programs; media organizations; and government contractors.
Tour operators, travel advisers, destination management companies, luxury travel companies and academic travel providers responsible for travelers in their care.
Nothing exempts anyone from becoming a victim. What preparation does is add friction — most
organized kidnappings are preceded by surveillance and target selection, which creates a
window in which being a harder target causes criminals to move on. Exposure is a
combination of where you are and how you behave there.
Where exposure comes from
Destination & environment
Destination-level crime and instability, and any known kidnapping or extortion activity
Political unrest, armed conflict, or an organized-crime presence
Weak or inconsistent law enforcement
High-risk border regions and remote work sites
Visibility & profile
Perceived wealth or corporate affiliation — wealth is relative to where you are standing, not where you are from
Executive visibility and publicly available family information
Social media exposure and real-time posting of your location or plans
Data breaches that expose personal details, and insider knowledge of movements
Patterns & logistics
Predictable routines and published itineraries — surveillance needs a pattern to work against
Insecure ground transportation, unvetted drivers, or unvetted accommodations
A recurring lesson from our casework
Most victims sensed something was wrong and rationalized the feeling away. If a situation
does not feel right, change it — leave, delay, or choose differently. That instinct is
information, and acting on it costs almost nothing.
If an Incident Occurs
General principles — not a live playbook
If an incident may be underway, stop reading and get help
This section is educational. It is not a substitute for professional response, law
enforcement or government authorities, and it deliberately omits negotiation tactics and
operational procedures. If you believe someone is in immediate danger or an incident may
be underway, contact local authorities, your government's consular service, or your
organization's designated emergency contact now.
General principles
Prioritize immediate safety above all else.
Contact appropriate authorities or your established organizational emergency contacts.
Preserve messages, numbers, accounts and transaction details — exact wording and records matter later.
Verify claims through an independent channel when it is appropriate and safe to do so.
Limit public disclosure, including on social media.
Follow established family or organizational protocols.
Avoid impulsive commitments; agreeing to pay establishes ability and willingness and cannot be walked back.
Do not attempt an independent rescue or confrontation.
Seek qualified professional guidance.
What "no concessions" does and does not mean
Families frequently read the U.S. and UK "no concessions" policies as meaning the government will not engage and they are on their own. That is not what the policies say. It is also a mistake to treat the two countries as equivalent — they diverge sharply on private payment. What follows is general background on published policy, not legal advice; anyone facing a live case should take advice specific to their situation and jurisdiction.
United States — PPD-30 (2015)
Presidential Policy Directive 30, issued 24 June 2015 alongside Executive Order 13698, reaffirmed that the U.S. government "will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding U.S. nationals hostage." Alongside that reaffirmation it made three things explicit that had not been clear before:10
No concessions does not mean no communication. The directive states that "the United States may assist private efforts to communicate with hostage-takers, whether directly or through public or private intermediaries," and that "the United States Government may itself communicate with hostage-takers, their intermediaries, interested governments, and local communities" to attempt to secure a safe recovery.
The Justice Department stated it does not intend to prosecute families who pay. The June 2015 policy review recorded that the Department "does not intend to add to families' pain in such cases by suggesting that they could face criminal prosecution." Note what changed and what did not: this was a statement of enforcement intent, not a repeal of the underlying material-support statutes, and it does not displace sanctions exposure.
It created a permanent body to run these cases. The interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell — hosted at the FBI and staffed from the FBI, State, Justice, Defense, Treasury and the intelligence community — became the government's dedicated operational coordinating body for recovering U.S. hostages abroad, working alongside the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs and the NSC's Hostage Response Group. Global Rescue's Global Risk Services team includes a former HRFC official.
That framework remains in force. Executive Order 14078 (July 2022) added sanctions and visa tools against hostage-takers while stating that EO 13698 and PPD-30 continue to apply to U.S. hostage recovery activities.10
United Kingdom — a firmer line on private payment
The UK shares the no-concessions position at government level but treats private payment differently. Under the Terrorism Act 2000, making funds available where there is knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect they may be used for terrorism is a criminal offence, and section 17A — inserted by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 — makes it an offence for an insurer to reimburse a payment it knows or has reasonable cause to suspect was made in response to a terrorist demand. Kidnap cases with no terrorist involvement are treated differently. The practical effect is that the U.S. assurance to families has no direct UK equivalent.11
Why this matters in practice
The distinction between the government making concessions and the government engaging at all is the difference between a narrow set of options and a wider one. Writing in 2019, researcher Danielle Gilbert framed PPD-30 as widening the zone of possible agreement, and noted that the Fusion Cell had by then recovered more than 200 hostages since its 2015 inception by using a range of approaches — from facilitating criminal ransoms, to influencing captor networks, to engaging third-party mediators.12 That figure is as of 2019 and is cited here as reported; a current figure should be sourced from the FBI or SPEHA before publication.
If you receive a call claiming someone has been taken
Several scenarios above begin with a phone call. In three of them, nobody has actually been taken. This sequence works across them because it verifies before it concedes anything.
Ask for the code wordIf you agreed to one in advance, this is the fastest resolution available. A recording, a voice clone, or a caller reading a script cannot produce it.
Have someone else call the person directlyOn another line, while you stay on this one. The FBI's guidance is explicit: attempt to contact your loved one before considering any payment.1
Record it, or take notesWhen taking notes, key details matter more than exact wording. If you do not remember specific details from the call, "I don't remember" is an acceptable response.
Concede nothingAgreeing to pay sets the price and invites escalation. Slow the call down — manufactured urgency is itself the tell.
Do not do this aloneThese schemes are built by teams and run against isolated people. Contact your security provider or law enforcement immediately.
Prevention for Travelers
Practical preparation for individuals and families
Most of what reduces kidnap, ransom, and extortion risk is done before departure and costs little. The single
highest-value preparation — a proof-of-life code word — takes five minutes and defeats an
entire category of phone-based crime.
Plan and prepare before you go
Review official travel advisories for your destination, and understand neighborhood-level risk rather than country averages.5
Enroll in applicable government traveler programs, such as the U.S. State Department's Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP).6
Share an itinerary with a trusted contact, and establish scheduled check-ins.
Save emergency contact information offline, and review your communication options for the destination.
Arrange vetted transportation; avoid hailing taxis off the street, and use recognized ride-share services or hotel-arranged transport.
Avoid publishing real-time travel plans, and limit visible signs of wealth.
Discuss family emergency procedures, and create a family verification phrase (a code word).
Review the limitations of your assistance and insurance coverage, and understand what security support is actually available to you.
Higher-risk travel
When a destination or role carries elevated risk, preparation should go further:
Obtain a destination-specific threat assessment and a security briefing.
Agree to missed check-in procedures and emergency communication protocols in advance.
Use vetted drivers and secure accommodations.
Practice basic surveillance awareness — if you see the same person more than once across a day, break your pattern and move to a safe place.
Define who makes decisions, and arrange professional response support before you travel.
Prevention for Businesses
Assessing and building organizational readiness
Organizations carry a duty of care for the people they send abroad. A KRE program is not a
single purchase — it is an assessment of exposure, a set of protocols, trained people, and
a tested plan for the day something goes wrong.
Preparation
Assess exposure
KRE risk assessment and traveler-risk profiling
Executive exposure reviews and family vulnerability assessment
High-risk travel approval thresholds
Build protocols
Travel security protocols and transportation/vendor vetting
Employee training and awareness
Crisis management planning and tabletop exercises
Govern and review
Clear communication plans and decision authority
Legal and compliance review
Insurance and assistance review
The governing standard: ISO 31030
ISO 31030:2021, "Travel risk management — Guidance for organizations," is the recognized international standard for how organizations manage risk to their travelers. Published by the International Organization for Standardization, it sets out a structured approach — policy, program development, threat and hazard identification, risk assessment, and prevention and mitigation — and applies to organizations of any type or size. It builds on ISO 31000, the parent risk-management framework.18
Core program elements a KRE-ready travel-risk program typically covers: destination- and route-level risk assessment (not just country ratings), traveler tracking, pre-travel briefings, and defined approval thresholds for high-risk travel.
Response planning
A readiness plan defines, in advance, who does what when an incident occurs — so decisions are not being invented under pressure. Drawn from Global Rescue's response and family-engagement practice:
Crisis management team activation and defined decision authority
Family liaison responsibilities — supporting the victim's family is its own operation, not an afterthought
Law enforcement and consular coordination
Information security and disciplined internal communication
Media and reputation management — one coordinated team, one voice
Board notification and business continuity
Documentation, post-incident support, and an after-action review
Data and Trends
What the numbers show — and what they don't
KRE data must be read carefully. This section presents figures from government, multilateral
and established institutional sources, each with its citation, alongside an explicit note on
why the true picture is larger than any dataset.
Selected figures
235
Aid workers kidnapped worldwide in 2025 — up from 138 in 2024, and the highest annual total in at least seven years. Humanitarian staff remain among the most exposed civilian groups.
Humanitarian Outcomes, Aid Worker Security Database · calendar year 2025 · verified through 31 Dec 2025; database updated 15 Jul 2026 · accessed 9 Aug 2026. Recorded incidents only — a floor, not a total.
54
U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad at some point in 2024, across 17 countries. Wrongful detainees — held by states — are the largest share.
James W. Foley Legacy Foundation, "Bringing Americans Home" 2024 · calendar year 2024 · published Mar 2025 · accessed 21 Jul 2026.
25
Crew kidnapped at sea in 2025 (up from 12 in 2024). The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 23 of the 25.
ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy & Armed Robbery Report 2025 · Jan–Dec 2025 · published Jan 2026 · accessed 21 Jul 2026. Reported incidents only.
137
Maritime piracy and armed-robbery incidents reported worldwide in 2025, up from 116 in 2024 (about +18%).
Extortion complaints to the FBI's IC3 in 2024 — the second-most-reported cybercrime category that year.
FBI / IC3, 2024 Internet Crime Report · calendar year 2024 · published 2025 · accessed 21 Jul 2026. Complaints filed only.
≈ 10,800
Extortion victims recorded in Mexico in 2024. Mexico's own victimization survey estimates roughly 97% of extortion goes unreported, so the true figure is far higher.
SESNSP (Mexico) via institutional reporting23 · 2024 · accessed 21 Jul 2026. SMEs to replace this statistic — do not publish as-is.
A note on virtual kidnapping: the FBI does not publish a standalone virtual-kidnapping count — it is handled within the IC3 extortion category and through public-service announcements. The FBI has separately warned that criminals use AI-generated voice cloning and altered proof-of-life media to make these schemes more convincing.22
How to read these numbers — methodology and limits
Underreporting is the rule. Kidnapping and extortion are frequently not reported to authorities, so confirmed cases may represent only part of the threat.
Definitions differ. Governments and data providers define kidnapping, hostage-taking and wrongful detention differently, and some datasets combine them.
Comparisons are fragile. Global comparisons should be interpreted carefully; a higher recorded number can reflect better reporting, not more crime.
Currency matters. Do not read old incident data as current risk without context; check the reporting period on every figure.
This section is designed to grow into a standalone Global KRE Data Center as the resource expands.
Expertise
Human expertise behind this hub
This resource is written and reviewed by Global Rescue's Global Risk Services team. Its
response consultants are retired FBI Supervisory Special Agents and former U.S. military
officers, and their careers are the reason this page can speak with authority on the subject.
Among them: a founding member of the U.S. Government's interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion
Cell, who served as its Crisis Negotiations Supervisor; a founding member of the Mexican
Anti-Kidnapping Unit initiative, with experience across more than 100 kidnapping cases in
Mexico and Latin America; and former FBI Academy adjunct faculty who taught kidnapping
investigation and hostage and crisis negotiation to law enforcement and intelligence
personnel internationally. Collectively their assignments span the FBI Crisis Negotiation
Unit, the Hostage Rescue Team, the International Operations Division and the CIA
Counterterrorism Center, across roughly three decades of crisis management, kidnapping
response and operational planning — domestically and abroad.
That team sits inside a wider organization. Global Rescue has provided medical, security and
crisis response services to individuals, families, businesses and enterprise clients
worldwide since 2004, supporting members in every country and operating around the clock.
Its clients include corporations, government agencies, universities, non-governmental
organizations and expedition and media operators working in difficult environments. The same
discipline applied to a live case informs what is published here: prevention treated as a
practice rather than an afterthought, and guidance grounded in what actually happens on
real cases.
To protect our team and the people we serve, we do not publish individual biographies, operational details, or information that could create security risks.
Government Resources
Government & institutional resources
A curated directory of authoritative external sources. Each entry is checked on a recurring schedule and marked with a "last verified" date.
The interagency body established under PPD-30 that coordinates U.S. government recovery efforts for nationals held hostage abroad, and works directly with families.
Advisory warning that making or facilitating ransomware payments may violate U.S. sanctions, with mitigating factors. Confirm no newer revision at review.
UN body addressing transnational organized crime, trafficking and terrorism prevention; custodian of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Coordinates cross-border police cooperation, including on maritime crime and missing persons (Yellow Notices). No single dedicated kidnapping page exists.
Clearinghouse offering families legal referrals, country-specific abduction guidance, emotional support and case resources.
NCMECFamilyU.S. / International
Global Rescue Services
How Global Rescue supports KRE prevention and response
Global Rescue's Kidnap, Ransom and Extortion services are delivered through Global Risk
Services (GRS) on a flat-rate membership — advisory support is available independently of any
insurance purchase, and prevention is treated as a proactive discipline rather than a
post-incident one.
Prevention services
Destination and itinerary risk assessments
Traveler security briefings
Executive and family exposure assessments
Security planning and organizational policy review
KRE preparedness planning, training and exercises
Intelligence and event monitoring
Advisory services
Access to security professionals and threat assessment
Incident verification support and decision support
Family and organizational guidance
Government and law enforcement coordination support
Communications recommendations and specialist consultation
Response services
Incident management support and crisis coordination
Kidnap and extortion response advisory
Family liaison guidance
Security evacuation or extraction where applicable
Medical and psychological support coordination
Post-incident recovery support
Preparation backed by expert response
Global Rescue Security ULTIMATE combines comprehensive KRE prevention training with access to experienced crisis negotiators and response consultants, including former members of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit. Learn how Global Rescue can help you prepare for KRE risks and provide expert support if an incident occurs.
Concise answers to the questions travelers, families and organizations ask most. Each links to deeper content where available.
What does KRE mean?
KRE stands for kidnap, ransom and extortion — a family of crimes in which a person is taken, or claimed to be taken, or coerced, in order to obtain money, property, concessions or advantage. It covers everything from classic kidnap for ransom to phone-based scams in which nobody is abducted at all. See Threat Types.
What is kidnap for ransom?
The unlawful detention of a person to demand payment or concessions from a third party — usually a family member or employer — in exchange for release. Victims are often selected on the appearance of wealth rather than actual wealth, and frequently after a period of surveillance.
What is express kidnapping?
A short-term abduction in which criminals force a victim to withdraw maximum cash from ATMs or move funds through banking apps, usually ending within hours once accounts are exhausted. It is common in parts of Latin America, Africa and Asia and is typically opportunistic. The specific danger is being "sold up" to a larger group for a longer kidnapping.
What is virtual kidnapping?
An extortion scam in which criminals falsely claim to have abducted a loved one and demand an immediate ransom. Nobody is taken; the scheme depends on fear and urgency to force payment before the claim can be verified — which is exactly why a pre-agreed code word defeats it in seconds.
What is wrongful detention, and how is it different from kidnapping?
Wrongful or arbitrary detention is carried out by a state rather than a criminal group — a government detains a person to gain leverage, such as a prisoner exchange or diplomatic concession. Unlike criminal kidnapping there is no ransom channel to work; resolution comes through consular and diplomatic processes, and timelines run to months or years.
What is the difference between kidnapping and hostage-taking?
The terms overlap. In general use, kidnapping emphasizes moving and concealing a victim to extract something from a third party, while hostage-taking emphasizes holding a person openly as leverage — often in a standoff or a politically motivated situation. Both may involve ransom or concessions; the practical difference is who the counterparty is and how resolution is reached.
What is the difference between ransom and extortion?
Ransom is a form of extortion, not a separate crime alongside it. Extortion is the broad category — obtaining money, property or services through coercion or threats — and it takes many forms. Ransom is the specific case where the leverage is a person being held, and payment is demanded for their release.
Most extortion involves no captivity at all. The leverage may be a threat of violence, the exposure of intimate or reputationally damaging material (sextortion), the encryption or publication of stolen data (ransomware and data extortion), or a recurring demand on a business for so-called protection. Virtual kidnapping sits here too: the demand imitates a ransom, but nobody has been taken. So every ransom demand is extortion, while most extortion is not a ransom demand.
Which travelers are most at risk?
Risk varies by destination, role and visibility rather than nationality alone. Journalists, humanitarian and NGO workers, executives, extractive-industry staff, students abroad and high-profile individuals tend to face elevated exposure — but opportunistic crimes such as express kidnapping can affect any traveler. See Who Is at Risk.
Which destinations have kidnapping risks?
The U.S. Department of State adds a "K" indicator to its Travel Advisories for countries where kidnapping or hostage-taking is a particular concern. Risk is not uniform within a country and the advisories change, so check the current advisory for your specific destination rather than relying on a general impression. See Government & institutional resources.
How reliable are global kidnapping statistics?
Treat them as a floor, not a full picture. Kidnapping and extortion are heavily underreported, definitions differ between governments and data providers, and some datasets combine kidnapping, hostage-taking and wrongful detention. Global comparisons should be interpreted carefully. See Data and Trends.
Does travel insurance provide KRE response support?
Not necessarily. Kidnap-and-ransom insurance is a financial product that reimburses costs after an incident, and advisory access is usually bundled with buying a policy. KRE response is the operational work of managing an incident — crisis negotiation, family support and coordination with authorities. Global Rescue provides response and advisory services through a flat-rate membership, independent of any insurance purchase.
What should I do if I receive a ransom or extortion demand?
Slow the call down and verify before conceding anything. Ask for the code word, have someone call the person directly on another line, and take notes or record it. Do not agree to pay before verifying, and do not handle it alone — contact your security provider or law enforcement immediately. See If an Incident Occurs. If someone may be in immediate danger, contact local authorities now.
Should I contact law enforcement?
In most cases, yes — and quickly. Extortion and virtual-kidnapping schemes are run by organized teams and are exactly the kind of crime authorities and professional responders are equipped to handle. Involving them early does not slow a legitimate resolution; handling it alone is what these schemes are designed to exploit.
Can criminals use AI to imitate a family member?
Yes. The FBI has warned that criminals now alter photos and audio — including AI-generated voice clones built from material scraped from social media — to manufacture fake proof of life in virtual-kidnapping scams.7 This is why a pre-agreed code word, which a clone cannot produce, is more reliable than "recognizing the voice."
How can businesses prepare employees?
Through a travel-risk-management program: assess exposure, set high-risk-travel approval thresholds, train and brief travelers, vet transportation and vendors, and rehearse the crisis plan with tabletop exercises. See Prevention for Businesses.
What should families do before someone travels?
Agree a proof-of-life code word, share the itinerary and set check-in times, save emergency contacts offline, and talk through what you would each do if you received a call. For families with an international custody dimension, address custody through the courts before any travel. See Prevention for Travelers.
My child was taken abroad by their other parent. Is that kidnapping?
Yes — it is called parental kidnapping, family abduction or custodial interference, and it is more common than kidnap for ransom. It runs on courts and treaties, not negotiation. If the child was taken to a country party to the Hague Abduction Convention, an application can be filed through the U.S. Central Authority, the State Department's Office of Children's Issues. The Convention is strictly civil and does not decide custody; its purpose is to restore the pre-abduction situation. The process can take years, which is why these cases are far more tractable before departure than after.4
How can Global Rescue help?
Global Rescue provides KRE prevention, advisory and response services through Global Risk Services (GRS) on a flat-rate membership — from destination risk assessments and traveler briefings to incident management and family support. See Global Rescue Services.
Sources & editorial notes
Sources
Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Virtual Kidnapping" — how virtual kidnapping schemes operate and what to do if targeted.
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), U.S. Department of State, "Kidnapping: The Basics" — express kidnapping and mitigation.
Terrorism Act 2000, section 17A (inserted by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) — the offence of insurer reimbursement of a terrorist ransom; see also sections 15–17 on making funds available for terrorism.
Danielle Gilbert, "'No Concessions'? A Closer Look at U.S. Hostage Recovery Policy", War on the Rocks (27 February 2019) — freely readable; source of the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell figure (as of 2019) and the quotation from its former director, Special Agent Rob Saale.
Extortion victim figures from Mexico's SESNSP, reported via institutional coverage (e.g. Mexico News Daily); ~97% underreporting per Mexico's ENVIPE victimization survey. To be confirmed against SESNSP/INEGI primary data before publication.
Cases described here are drawn from real-life cases, with identifying details removed. They are included because patterns repeat — not as statistics. Where this guide describes what is more or less common from our casework, it says so, and does not present it as a measured rate.
This page is general educational guidance and is not legal advice. If a child has been taken across a border, or you are dealing with a detention by a foreign government, contact your government's consular service. Every external link is checked on a recurring schedule and marked with a last-verified date in the resource directory.
